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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Kent Ostler filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging, in part, that 
his guilty plea was the product of his trial counsel’s manipulation as counsel told 
Mr. Ostler that he could not get a psychosexual evaluation until after he pled guilty.  The 
district court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal.  In dismissing this claim, 
the court held that Mr. Ostler failed to support the claim with an affidavit or testimony 
from his trial counsel.  Mr. Ostler asserts that the district court abused its discretion by 
summarily dismissing this claim. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 In September of 2012, Kent Ostler pled guilty to one count of lewd conduct with a 
minor; in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss a persistent violator enhancement 
allegation, but there was no sentencing agreement.  (R., p.47.)  Mr. Ostler was 
sentenced to a unified term of 30 years, with 10 year fixed, and his sentence was 
affirmed on appeal.  (R., p.27.) 
 Acting pro se, Mr. Ostler filed a timely Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction 
Relief.  (R., pp.4-11.)  In his petition, Mr. Ostler asserted, in part, that “Counsel 
manipulated Petitioner into pleading guilty by telling Petitioner he had to plead guilty in 
order to do the evaluation.”  (R., p.6.)  He alleged that “The Prosecutor along with 
counsel, told Petitioner that in order to do the evaluation he had to plead guilty” … “[a]nd 
that if Petitioner was considered a low risk that a plea deal for a sentence would be 
negotiated.”  (R., p.7.)  Mr. Ostler claimed that the “Prosecutor had no intention of 
negotiating with Petitioner for a sentence, it was only a ploy to get Petitioner to plead 
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guilty and ask for the maximum sentence.”  (R., p.7.)  In his supporting affidavit, 
Mr. Ostler swore that “Had Petitioner had an effective attorney, Petitioner would have 
proceeded to trial,” that “Petitioner was told that in order to get the evaluation that 
Petitioner had to enter a plea of guilty,” and that, “Petitioner was also told that if 
Petitioner was deemed a low risk that a deal in regards to sentence would be made.”  
(R., p.10.)  Mr. Ostler also swore that, “Petitioner would have not entered a plea of guilty 
had [he] not been manipulated” and that he “was manipulated into pleading guilty by his 
attorney and the prosecutor.”  (R., pp.10-11.)  The district court granted Mr. Ostler’s 
request for appointed counsel.  (R., pp.12-15, 24.) 
 The State filed an Answer in which it denied Mr. Ostler’s substantive claims, and 
in which it asserted affirmative defenses in general terms, but not specific to any 
particular claims.  (R., pp.26-30.)  The State attached to its Answer a copy of the written 
plea agreement, a copy of the district court’s Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
plea, which was entered prior Mr. Ostler’s sentencing hearing, and a transcript of the 
entry of plea hearing.  (R., pp.31-52.)  The State eventually filed a motion for summary 
dismissal “on the grounds and for the reasons set forth in the State’s Verified Answer to 
Petition For Post Conviction Relief[.]”  (R., pp.59-60.) 
 After a hearing, the district court entered an Order Granting Respondent’s Motion 
for Summary Disposition.  (R., pp.64-78.)  Regarding Mr. Ostler’s claim that “he was told 
that to get the ‘evaluation,’1 [he] had to enter a plea of guilty,” the district court held as 
follows, 
                                            
1 During the hearing, counsel for Mr. Ostler confirmed that the “evaluation” Mr. Ostler 
was referring to in his pro se filings, was the Psychosexual Evaluation.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.10-
19.)  
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Ostler did not offer an affidavit from [trial counsel] or anyone else to 
support this conclusory allegation. At the hearing, counsel for Ostler 
argued that [trial counsel] should be questioned under oath about this 
alleged statement by [trial counsel].  [Trial counsel] could have been 
subpoenaed to testify at the hearing on the State's Motion.  In addition, the 
question could have been put to [trial counsel] by way of a deposition or 
request for an affidavit.  Mere conclusory statements, without more, will 
not raise an issue of fact. 
 
(R., p.73.)  Mr. Ostler filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s final 
judgment.  (R., pp.79-84.)     
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal of 
Mr. Ostler’s claim that his guilty plea was not voluntary, because there exists a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether his guilty plea was a product of his counsel’s 
manipulation? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Granting The State’s Motion For Summary Dismissal Of 
Mr. Ostler’s Claim That His Guilty Plea Was Not Voluntary, Because There Exists A 
Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether His Guilty Plea Was A Product Of His 
Counsel’s Manipulation 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Mr. Ostler filed a verified petition and a notarized affidavit in which he swore that 
his trial counsel manipulated him into pleading guilty by telling him he could not get a 
psychosexual evaluation prior to entering his guilty plea and that, but for his counsel’s 
manipulation, he would not have pled guilty but would have taken his case to trial.  The 
State did not present any evidence rebutting this claim.  Because Mr. Ostler raised a 
genuine issue of material fact, which was not rebutted by the State, the district court 
erred in summarily dismissing this claim.   
 
B. Standards Of Review 
 
A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature, and like a 
plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her allegations upon which the 
requests for relief are based by a preponderance of the evidence.  State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008).  However, unlike a plaintiff in other civil cases, the original 
post-conviction petition must allege more than merely “a short and plain statement of 
the claim.”  Id. at 443-444.  The application must present or be accompanied by 
admissible evidence supporting the allegations contained therein, or else the post-
conviction petition may be subject to dismissal.  Id.  In addition, the post-conviction 
petition must set forth with specificity the legal grounds upon which the application is 
based.  Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). 
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A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through 
post-conviction proceedings.   Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 769, 185 P.3d 921, 925 
(Ct. App. 2008).  To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner 
must first show that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
760 (1988).  Where a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is 
shown if there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  Strickland, at 694; Aragon at 
760.  Where a petitioner claims that his guilty plea was induced by the erroneous advice 
of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s erroneous advice, the 
petitioner would not have entered into the plea agreement.  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 59-60 (1985). 
A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition only where the 
petition and evidence supporting the petition fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
that, if resolved in the petitioner’s favor, would entitle him or her to the relief requested.  
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.  “A material fact has ‘some logical connection with the 
consequential facts[,]’ Black’s Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is 
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties.”  Id.  On 
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary 
hearing, the appellate court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. 
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896 (Ct. App. 1993).  “‘[W]here the evidentiary facts are 
not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary 
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judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the 
court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences.’” 
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444 (quoting Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 
(1982).)  Furthermore,  
“When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is 
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion 
for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most 
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.”  
 
Id. (quoting Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437 (1991).) 
The United States Supreme Court has defined the standard for whether there 
exists a genuine issue of material fact as whether “the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  “The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry 
of determining whether there is the need for a trial – whether, in other words, there are 
any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either party.”  Id. at 
250.  If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.  
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.  The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner “must be 
regarded as true” for purposes of summary dismissal.  Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 
247, 250 (2009).  Any disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, 
and “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of 
the non-moving party.”  Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009). 
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C. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Ostler’s Claim That His 
Guilty Plea Was The Product Of His Trial Counsel Manipulating Him As Trial 
Counsel Told Mr. Ostler He Could Not Get A Psychosexual Evaluation Prior To 
Pleading Guilty  
 
 Through his verified petition and his affidavit in support, Mr. Ostler claimed, inter 
alia, the following: “The Prosecutor along with counsel, told Petitioner that in order to do 
the evaluation he had to plead guilty” … “[a]nd that if Petitioner was considered a low 
risk that a plea deal for a sentence would be negotiated”; “Had Petitioner had an 
effective attorney, Petitioner would have proceeded to trial”; “Petitioner was told that in 
order to get the evaluation that Petitioner had to enter a plea of guilty”; “Petitioner was 
also told that if Petitioner was deemed a low risk that a deal in regards to sentence 
would be made”; “Petitioner would have not entered a plea of guilty had [he] not been 
manipulated”; and, “Petitioner was manipulated into pleading guilty by his attorney and 
the prosecutor.”  (R., pp.7-11.)  The State provided no evidence to rebut Mr. Ostler’s 
claims. 
 The district court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal based upon 
its finding that Mr. Ostler failed to present a sworn statement from his trial counsel 
verifying his claims.  (R., p.73.)  This is not the correct standard.  Summary dismissal is 
appropriate only where the petition and evidence supporting the petition fail to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner’s favor, would entitle him 
or her to the relief requested.  Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.  If indeed Mr. Ostler’s plea 
was based upon a false statement by his trial counsel that he could not get a 
psychosexual evaluation unless he pled guilty knowing that the outcome of the 
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evaluation would have an impact on the sentencing recommendations,2 he could be 
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.  See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1985).  
Because the State failed to rebut Mr. Ostler’s claim that he was manipulated into 
pleading guilty by his counsel’s objectively false statement that he could not participate 
in a psychosexual evaluation unless he pled guilty, summary dismissal was not 
appropriate.  Thus, the district court erred by granting the State’s motion for summary 
dismissal. 
     
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Ostler respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order 
granting the State’s motion for summary disposition and remand his case to the district 
court for an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his guilty plea was manipulated by his 
attorney’s false advice. 
 DATED this 28th day of June, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      JASON C. PINTLER 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
                                            
2 Mr. Ostler acknowledged when he entered his guilty plea that the plea agreement did 
not include any agreed upon sentencing recommendations.  (See R., pp.32, 47.)  This is 
not dispositive, however, for two reasons.  First, the fact that the parties did not agree 
upon a sentencing recommendation prior to the entry of the plea does not conclusively 
demonstrate that the parties did not anticipate the possibility of later agreeing upon a 
sentencing recommendation in light of the evaluator’s conclusions.  Second, the district 
court did not dismiss Mr. Ostler’s claim that his guilty plea was manipulated by trial 
counsel based upon any finding that Mr. Ostler failed to demonstrate prejudice. 
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